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1. Pain perception 
Bodily sensations, for instance pains, are often thought to pose insuperable difficulties for 
representational theories of consciousness. Chris is never one to dodge a problem, and 
chapter 6 of his splendid and instructive Consciousness is devoted to outlining a 
perceptual/representational theory of pain, in the tradition of Armstrong and Pitcher. 
 Perceptual theories of pain are not the same as representational theories of pain. 
According to a perceptual theory of pain, when one has a pain in one’s toe (for example), 
one perceives some sort of disturbance in one’s toe. (At least in a typical case: the 
perceptual theorist will want to allow for illusions and hallucinations of such 
disturbances.1) Pain perception is interoception—perception specialized for delivering 
information about one’s own body, like proprioception and the vestibular sense.  
 According to a representational theory of pain, the felt quality of pain, or the 
“phenomenal character” of pain, can be fully explained in representational or intentional 
terms. A perceptual theory does not entail a representational one, anymore than a 
perceptual theory of vision (which of course everyone holds) entails a representational 
one (which not everyone holds). Neither does the converse entailment hold. One may 
hold a representational theory of imagery, say, without thereby turning imagery into 
perception. I will set aside the issue of representationalism, and concentrate here on what 
Chris calls the “paradox of pain”, which he presents chiefly as a problem for perceptual 
theories of pain. 
Perception involves dedicated mechanisms of sensory transduction that result in 
the delivery of ecologically useful information about the perceiver’s environment. Vision, 
to take the most prominent example, delivers a large variety of information about the 
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experiences of color are never veridical). This “eliminativist” variant of the perceptual theory will be 
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shape, motion, texture, and color of the scene before the eyes. The extra-bodily 
environment is not the only part of the environment of interest—the state of the perceiver 
herself is also important. A perceiver can turn her external senses towards herself: you 
can check the position of your feet by looking, or palpate a lump on your head, for 
instance. But other more direct methods are useful, and so it is no surprise that there are 
specialized mechanisms for this purpose: proprioception informs us about the position of 
our limbs, and the vestibular sense informs us about our balance. Such information about 
our bodily states is crucial for successful action, of course. 
 Similarly, it’s no surprise that a car has systems designed to detect its internal 
states (the gas gauge and tachometer, for example)—they are useful for much the same 
reason. Further, the gas gauge (measuring the internal environment), and the outside air 
temperature sensor (measuring the external environment) deliver their proprietary 
messages in the same calm unobtrusive manner, not making much of a song and dance 
about it. 
 Sometimes conditions threatening the car’s well-being arise that demand quick 
action—near-empty tank, low oil pressure, etc. Cars have systems to detect those 
conditions as well, and it’s no surprise that the message delivery is more strident and eye-
catching—the dashboard warning light. (There is even the maximally vague “check 
engine” light, apt to induce disturbing sense of unease. Something is wrong, but what?) 
 Pursuing the parallel, one might expect organisms to have their own versions of 
dashboard warning lights, and there are no better candidates than pains. And since a 
dashboard warning light is not just a pretty glow, but a messenger, like the speedometer, 
these armchair biological reflections motivate a perceptual view of pain.   
 Consciousness contains many persuasive considerations (some drawn from the 
empirical study of pain) in favor of a perceptual view, so in what follows I will take a 
perceptual view for granted.2  
 Some terminology before we get going. Let painful disturbances be the sorts of 
items that (according to the perceptual theorist) one perceives via one’s pain-perception 
system—in the case of having a pain in one’s toe, the disturbance that is (or at any rate 
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appears to be) in the toe. (For simplicity I shall ignore cases where the perceived object is 
a body part, as in ‘My toe is painful/hurts’.) Whether such disturbances are to be 
identified with anything physical is not our present focus.3 Experiences of pain are the 
states of being ostensibly aware of such disturbances. 
 A bare perceptual view of pain is not committed to any view about the semantics 
of ‘pain’ and its cognates. One could hold a perceptual view and deny that we ever use 
locutions involving the word ‘pain’ to refer to painful disturbances. That sounds odd, but 
it is actually Chris’s final position. ‘Pain’, Chris thinks, does not refer: he “[i]n 
effect….denies that there is such a thing as pain” (Hill 2009: 224). A fortiori, ‘pain’ does 
not refer to painful disturbances. 
 Still, on the assumption that the word ‘pain’ does refer, it would be quite peculiar 
if painful disturbances were perceived and the folk never used the word ‘pain’ to pick 
them out. We usually have commonplace words and phrases that can be readily used to 
describe the objects of perception (‘yellow banana’, ‘C-sharp’, ‘rough surface’, etc.), so 
why not here? (If painful disturbances turn out to be, say, certain kinds of bodily insults, 
the theorist might refer to them in those terms. But the Plain Man in pain is not in a 
position to do that.) So let the simple perceptual view of pain be the view that painful 
disturbances are perceived and that certain locutions involving ‘pain’ are used to refer to 
them.  
2. The paradox of pain 
The paradox is generated by the conjunction of the simple perceptual view of pain and 
either one of the following two principles: 
(A) If x is in pain, then it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an 
experiential ground for judging that x is in pain 
(B) If it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an experiential ground 
for judging that x is in pain, then x really is in pain (169). 
                                                
3 According to Chris, painful disturbances are “bodily disturbances”, “peripheral disturbances involving 
actual or potential damage” (Hill 2009: 177). That is not being assumed here. 
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Successful perception in general requires the cooperation of the object perceived and the 
perceptual mechanism. On the one hand, the object might not affect the mechanism, or 
might not affect it in the right way. The mere presence of a red tomato, or the mere 
crossing of my legs, is not sufficient for the perception of the tomato, or my crossed legs. 
On the other hand, the mechanism might be affected in the way it is in cases of 
perception, but not by the object. So if pains are perceived (as the simple view has it), 
then both cases should be possible: unperceived pain, and pain hallucinations. I think 
Chris would accept the following gloss on (A) and (B), respectively: all pains are 
perceived, and there are no pain hallucinations. Thus Chris claims that (A) and (B) are 
“two folk principles that preclude an appearance/reality distinction for pain” (186), ruling 
out the simple perceptual view. That is the paradox of pain. 
 The simple perceptual view of pain is plausible. But are (A) or (B) plausible too? 
According to Chris, plausibility is something of an understatement: 
[W]e regard it as absurd to say that an agent is in pain in circumstances in which 
the agent is not aware of the pain, and…we regard it as absurd to say that an 
agent is not in pain in circumstances in which it seems to the agent that he or she 
is in pain. This suggests that we think of (A) and (B) as necessary truths—that is, 
as holding either because of deep metaphysical facts about our awareness of pain, 
or because of the a priori structure of our concept of pain. (170) 
Chris does go on to say that there is some recalcitrant evidence—we think that pains can 
wake us up, for example—but dismisses it as not “represent[ing] a dominant strand in our 
commonsense conception of pain” (171). 
 As I said, I agree with Chris that painful disturbances are perceived. I also agree 
that (A) and (B) are plausible (in fact, I think they are true). I don’t, though, think this 
generates a paradox for the simple perceptual view. There is a closely related puzzle in 
the vicinity, but as far as I can see this has nothing in particular to do with pain.  
3. The status of (A) and (B) 
According to Chris, the principles (A) and (B) “are partially constitutive of the concept of 
pain” (186). I think that Chris understands this to have the following consequence: 
anyone possessing the concept of pain believes (A) and (B), and moreover believes them 
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“to enjoy a kind of necessity” (171)—or at any rate is disposed to have these beliefs on 
contemplating these two principles. If that is right, then by his own lights Chris cannot 
respond to the paradox simply by denying (A) and (B), since he certainly possesses the 
concept of pain. And indeed he does not. He thinks that the paradox shows that the 
concept of pain is “semantically incoherent” (190), somewhat as the concept of a round 
square is semantically incoherent. A round square must be round, and also must be 
square, but nothing can be both. Similarly, according to Chris, “Folk 
psychology…requires us to think of pains as objects of experiential awareness” (188), 
which makes an appearance/reality distinction all but inevitable; but folk psychology also 
insists that there is no such distinction. Chris’s positive recommendation is that we set 
“[the concept of pain] aside” and replace “it with three new concepts that have separate 
conceptual roles” (190), specifically concepts for painful disturbances, experiences of 
pain, and pain affect. Although Chris doesn’t explicitly deny (A) and (B), he does speak 
of “rejecting” them (188)—if this doesn’t amount to denying (A) and (B), what does it 
mean? One might have expected Chris to endorse (A) and (B), while emphasizing that 
they don’t imply that anyone really is in pain.  
 Chris argues for the conclusion that the principles (A) and (B) “are partially 
constitutive of the concept of pain” in two steps. First, he argues that if “the folk concept 
of pain is governed by” a certain pair of rules, then (A) and (B) are partially constitutive 
of the concept of pain. Second, he argues that the folk concept of pain is governed by 
these two rules, on the grounds that “we have a very powerful motive for having a 
concept” that is so governed. 
 Chris states the two rules as follows: 
(R1) One is fully and unqualifiedly entitled to form a first person judgment of the 
form I am in pain if one is currently having an experience of pain. 
(R2) One is not entitled to form a first person judgment of the form I am in pain 
unless one is currently having an experience of pain. (183) 
One question that arises at this point, and which is not explicitly addressed in the book, is 
just what Chris means by saying that a concept is “governed by” such-and-such rules. 
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Moreover, whatever the answer to this, (R1) and (R2) are not in fact cast in the form of 
rules (‘Do so-and-so’, ‘You should do so-and-so’, etc.). 
 However, Chris’s intent is not hard to discern, and for present purposes a close 
enough approximation to it is, I think, as follows. (See Hill 2005: 82-3.) Our concept pain 
is governed by (R1) and (R2) just in case, respectively: 
(G1) Someone possessing the concept pain is disposed to form the first person 
judgment I am in pain when she is currently having an experience of pain, no 
matter what else she believes at the time. 
(G2) Someone possessing the concept pain will not form the first person 
judgment I am in pain unless she is currently having an experience of pain, no 
matter what else she believes at the time. 
According to Chris, if “a subject is conforming to [(R1) and (R2)], then he or she will 
have absolutely no motivation for distinguishing between the appearance of pain and the 
reality of pain” (184). That is, if (G1) and (G2) are true, then anyone who possess the 
concept pain “will have absolutely no motivation for distinguishing between the 
appearance of pain and the reality of pain”. As Chris puts it a little later, the truth of (G1) 
and (G2) explains “why it is not apparent to us from the perspective of folk psychology 
that it is possible to draw an appearance/reality distinction with respect to pain” (185). 
This is Chris’s way of restating the claim that (G1) and (G2) show that (A) and (B) are 
“partially constitutive of our concept of pain”. So do they? 
 Take (G1). It is supposed to show, specifically, that (B) is “partially constitutive 
of our concept of pain”, which I am taking Chris to mean (roughly) that anyone who 
possesses the concept pain will believe it to be necessary that whenever there is the 
appearance of pain, there is pain. 
I possess the concept pain, so if (G1) is true, I am disposed to judge that I am in 
pain whenever I am having an experience of pain, no matter what else I believe. One 
immediate problem is that the mere truth of (G1) is surely not going to suggest any (B)-
like principle to me—I also need to know (or believe) that (G1) is true. So let us further 
suppose (since this can only help Chris) that I know that I have this disposition. It is not 
clear to me why this implies that I will believe the appearance of pain is sufficient for the 
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reality of pain. First, I sometimes think I have belief-forming dispositions that are not 
entirely reasonable. Perhaps this is a case in point: I am just overly gullible where the 
appearance of pain is concerned. Second, what about the appearance of pain in others? 
Why could I not regard myself as one of the privileged few for whom the appearance of 
pain is an infallible guide? These seem live options, at least—why must I dismiss them 
out of hand? Third, where is the necessity coming from? Even if the argument shows that 
I believe that whenever there is the appearance of pain, there is pain, why must I regard 
the negation of this as absurd? Why can’t I think of it as contingent? 
 Similar remarks go for Chris’s attempt to argue from (G2) to the conclusion that 
(A) is partially constitutive of the concept of pain. 
 So I am not convinced by the first step of Chris’s argument, that if the folk 
concept of pain is governed by the two rules (R1) and (R2), then the principles (A) and 
(B), as Chris understands them, are partially constitutive of the concept of pain. What 
about the second step, that the folk concept of pain is governed by these two rules? Chris 
writes: 
Is it true that the folk concept of pain is governed by (R1) and (R2)? I think we 
can see that it is true, and also understand why it is true, by noticing that we have 
a very powerful motive for having a concept that can be used to keep track of the 
experience of pain—that is, to encode and store information about the experience. 
The motivation comes from the causal powers that are possessed by the 
experiences of pain, or, equivalently, by the somatosensory representations that 
constitute such experiences. It is these somatosensory representations that directly 
control the activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and in the limbic system that 
determines our affective response to pain…And of course, it is pain affect that 
makes pain so important to us. Without the response, pains would be of no more 
interest to us than tingles and mild sensations of pressure. (185) 
We do, Chris acknowledges, have a motive for having a concept of painful 
disturbances—he identifies them with what he calls “bodily disturbances”4—but: 
                                                
4 See note 3 above. 
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Bodily disturbances have the power to cause pain affect only insofar as they have 
the power to cause somatosensory representations. Accordingly, it is much less 
important that we have a concept that can be used to keep close tabs on bodily 
disturbances than that we have a concept that can be used to keep close tabs on 
representations of the relevant sort. (185) 
Chris is quite explicit about the upshot: the folk concept of pain (or, more simply, the 
concept pain) is governed by (R1) and (R2). We can break this down into two parts: (i) 
we have a concept C that is governed by rules that are structurally like (R1) and (R2), and 
(ii) C = the concept pain. 
What Chris appears to offer in support of (i) and (ii) is an explanation of why we 
have “a concept that can be used to keep track of the experience of pain”. In brief, we 
have that such a concept because “we have a very powerful motive for having [it]”. 
Suppose that explanation is right and let the concept that keeps track of the experience of 
pain be C*. What’s the argument that C* is governed by rules like (R1) and (R2), or that 
C* is the concept pain?  
 Concerning the second question, the argument cannot be that the concept pain is 
the only candidate to be C*, because one concept we have “that can be used to keep track 
of the experience of pain” is, of course, the concept experience of pain. And by Chris’s 
own lights, the concept experience of pain really is another candidate for C*—that 
concept is not the concept pain, because the concept experience of pain has application, 
unlike the concept pain. 
Chris’s discussion here is something of a double-edged sword. As he points out, 
we have an interest in keeping tabs on experiences of pain, and also on painful 
disturbances. (Remember the dashboard analogy. When the check engine light goes on, 
we want it to go off, because it’s a big distraction. But the fault in the engine is also of 
great importance.) Presumably we also have an interest in keeping tabs on experiences of 
pain and painful disturbances without falling into semantic incoherence. So why don’t 
we? 
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4. (A) and (B) revisited, and the puzzle of pain 
Let us go back to Chris’s two principles that are supposed to generate the paradox of 
pain.  
(A) If x is in pain, then it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an 
experiential ground for judging that x is in pain 
(B) If it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an experiential ground 
for judging that x is in pain, then x really is in pain 
First, I shall argue that both (A) and (B) are true—or at any rate true when read in a very 
natural way. Then I shall argue that there is no conflict with the simple perceptual view. 
Chris’s paradox of pain doesn’t completely evaporate, though; it leaves a residue that I 
will call the puzzle of pain, and I shall end with a brief discussion of that. 
  When we say that x feels pain, or is in pain, what are we saying? If x’s phantom 
limb is playing up again, surely he feels pain. That strongly suggests that to feel pain, or 
(what seems to be equivalent) to be in pain, is simply to enjoy an experience of pain. 
‘Feels hot’ provides a close parallel, as Armstrong pointed out (1968: 315). If one feels 
hot, then one does not have to be hot. Similarly if one’s hand feels hot. For one’s hand to 
feel hot is simply for one to enjoy an experience of heat-in-the-hand. 
 Now what does ‘x has an experiential ground for judging that x is in pain’ mean, 
in the statement of (A) and (B)? Clearly it means that x has an experience of pain. And, as 
just argued, to have an experience of pain is to be in pain. So, since ‘it seems to x that x is 
in pain’ is supposed to be understood as ‘x has an experiential ground for judging that x is 
in pain’, (A) and (B) are both equivalent to the tautologous: 
() If x is in pain, then x is in pain. 
Now from the fact that there are locutions involving ‘hot’ that refer to experiences of 
heat, it does not follow that there are no locutions involving ‘hot’ that refer to actual 
thermal phenomena. Likewise, from the fact that there are locutions involving ‘pain’ that 
refer to experiences of pain, it does not follow that there are no locutions involving ‘pain’ 
that refer to painful disturbances. And (as Chris himself points out) such locutions are 
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easy to find, namely those locating pains in a part of the body—there is a pain in my 
foot/I have a pain in my foot, etc.  
 So as far as I can see, we can have our cake and eat it too. (A) and (B) are true, 
and so is the simple perceptual view of pain: painful disturbances are both perceived and 
talked about. 
 Finally, the residual “puzzle of pain”. Earlier, I said that Chris would accept the 
following gloss on (A) and (B): all pains are perceived, and there are no hallucinations of 
pain. I have argued, in effect, that that this isn’t the right gloss on (A) and (B). But the 
gloss itself seems right. If x has a pain in his foot, he must feel, or be aware of, the pain in 
his foot. And if x is ostensibly aware of a pain in his foot, there may be no foot, but there 
must be a pain that x is aware of. Or so we are inclined to think.  
 According to the simple perceptual theory, these claims we are inclined to accept 
are false; at the very least, they are not necessarily true, or “constitutive of our concept of 
pain”. Fortunately for the simple perceptual theory, Chris has not argued that they are. 
A simple perceptual theorist needs to explain why we have these mistaken 
inclinations.5 But whatever their source, I doubt it has anything to do with the special 
features of pain. We are equally apt to collapse appearance and reality for afterimages 
and non-painful tingles, for example. As anyone who has taught intro philosophy of mind 
knows, many undergraduates find the view that afterimage-experiences are hallucinations 
very hard to accept. 
 And finally, Chris faces his own version of the puzzle of pain. For him, it is a 
puzzle expressed in our jargon of ‘painful disturbances’, rather than the ordinary word 
‘pain’, but it is no less puzzling for that. Consider the following two claims. If x has a 
painful disturbance in his foot, he must feel, or be aware of, the painful disturbance in his 
foot. And if x is ostensibly aware of a painful disturbance in his foot, there may be no 
foot, but there must be a painful disturbance that x is aware of. Suppose Chris is right 
about the incoherence of ‘pain’. Still, don’t those two claims strike us as true? 
  Chris’s penetrating chapter on pain brings us good and bad news: a perceptual 
view of pain is true, but our ordinary thought and talk about pain is fundamentally 
                                                
5 For some helpful suggestions see Ganson and Ganson 2010. 
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defective. I have tried to soften the bad news a bit: we are confused about pain, but 
ordinary language is perfectly in order as it is.6  
                                                
6 Thanks to Murat Aydede for comments. 
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